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The use of veils among contemporary Muslim women triggers a large 
range of emotions and concepts in the general public and among Muslim 
communities in different places. The general public perception of veiling 
shifts from manifestations of female oppression to concepts of liberation of 
women from the male gaze. Individuals, as well as state institutions, 
attempt at controlling the use of veils, either by restricting or enforcing it. 
Up to day, veiling is a sphere where contesting identities clash and at times 
attract public debates.1 Several such incidents have raised international 
public discourse, in Germany,2 and elsewhere. In 2016 France attempted at 
declaring the “Burka Law”, but since was suspended. Several other places 
attempted at declaring a similar law, e.g. Swiss, Germany and Québec;3 And 
the French law forbidding religious marks in schools.4 These are but a few 
of the recent incidents concerning female cover in public. 
Throughout the ages religious scholars discussed the kinds of veil, what 
to veil, and when to veil, producing diverse answers. For instance, Muslim 
legal scholars discuss the term `Awra, i.e. the parts in the human body that 
are to be covered when not in private quarters.Scholars also debate which 
parts of the female body should be visible when in public. Legal as well as 
social debates provide answers ranging from a head and face cover to 
complete covering all of the body, leaving only enough room to see 
through.5 
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1  There are numerous discussions, public, religious, gender, legal and more. One such 
example is: https://tinyurl.com/y8af35r3 (accessed October 25, 2017). 
2 http://tinyurl.com/gnf374n (accessed January 3, 2018). 
3 There are numerous discussions, public, religious, gender, legal and more. One such 
recent example is: https://tinyurl.com/y8af35r3 (accessed October 25, 2017). 
4 http://tinyurl.com/jglcxg7 (accessed January 3, 2018). The law is commonly perceived 
as directed against veils rather than religious symbols in general. See for instance 
Melanie Adrian, “France, the Veil and Religious Freedom,” Religion, State & Society 37.4 
(2009), pp. 345-374. 
5 For an overview see Lila Abu-Lughod, “Modesty Discourses: Overview,” Encyclopedia of 
Women & Islamic Cultures. General Editor Suad Joseph. (Brill Online, 2015). Reference. 
TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY SOURASKY LIBRARY. 14 August 2015 
http://tinyurl.com/zx4rb7o; see also Susan Spectorsky, Women in Classical Islamic 
Law: a Survey of the Sources. (Brill, 2009), pp. 50, 190. 
A Google search brings up many contemporary discussions regarding veils in various 
situations. See for instance http://islamqa.info/en/2198 (accessed on August 5, 2015) 




For instance, how should a woman be dressed when praying? Tenth 
century Quran exegetist and historian Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 
925) mentions that a woman should have her face and hands revealed 
when praying, whereas other parts are to be covered.6 
The issue debated upon was not only what parts should be exposed by 
women in the public domain, but also under which circumstances is a 
woman required to show her face to a non-relative. One case in point was 
the medieval debate regarding veiling in court; should a woman present in 
court show her face to the judge? Is it a requirement? The question was of 
concern for medieval Jewish as well as Muslim legal circles. Identification 
was crucial in many cases, for instance when a woman wishes to secure 
divorce, or make a claim over property. Her identity is critical for the legal 
process. Tillier brings several cases in which Muslim women addressed a 
Qadi and hence were asked to reveal their faces for the sake of 
identification. In many of these cases, husbands, reluctant to allow their 
wives’ faces become public spectacle, agreed to their every demand.7 
Numerous court records found in the Geniza indicate that Jewish 
women appearing before the Jewish court, were recognized and their 
identity needed to be validated – most likely because their faces were 
covered and had to be revealed: בהא אלמערפה צחّה בעד מנהא ואקנינא  (= and we 
performed the legally binding act of purchase after we validate her 
identity),8 In another case it was explicitly stated that the woman’s 
identification was validate by two other women.9 Such a requirement was 
made in different times and places, one such case is recorded from 16th 
century Damascus: Dotan Arad analyzes the troubles of a young bride 
whose divorce is questioned due to the fact that the woman’s face were 
covered when issued the divorce: 
[A]nd then the young woman stand before us together with her 
grandmother to accept the divorce deed (get) from her husband’s proxy 
                                                                                                                                                   
where ten permissible situations in which a woman is allowed to keep her face and 
hands uncovered are discussed. 
6 Clothing and adorning one’s body has many different aspects, it relates social norms 
and practices, and also sends certain messages to the world. See for instance Hadas 
Hirsch, “Personal Grooming and Outward Appearance in Early Muslim Societies,” Al-
Masaq 23.2 (2011), pp. 99-116. Sepctorsky, Women in Classical Islamic Law, p. 50, 190. 
7 Mathieu Tillier, “Women before the Qādī Under the Abbasids,” Islamic Law and Society 
16.3 (2009), pp. 280-301. The demand from women to reveal their faces in front of the 
qādi is still a prerequisite in most Muslim courts to date. Authors wish to thank Dr. Ido 
Shahar of Haifa University for sharing this information. 
8 E.g TS 24.15, published by Amir Ashur, “Engagement and Betrothal documents from 
the Cairo Geniza”, PhD diss. (Hebrew). (Tel Aviv University 2006), pp. 214-215; another 
example in TS 18 J 1.28, published ibid. pp. 248-251. 
9 Bodl. MS. Heb. c. 13, fol. 20, margins, l. 2, published by Mordechai Akiva Friedman, 
Jewish Polygyny in the Middle Ages (Hebrew). (Tel-Aviv, 1986). 




and she covered her face as customary among pious women when they 
appearing in court to be divorced.10 
 
Veils are mentioned in dowry lists from the Geniza records. Such lists 
suggest women used veils but not the nature of these veils, or the way they 
were used, who was required to wear them, what exactly they covered and 
in what occasions.11 Further elaboration to the possibility that non-
Muslims women adopted Islamic dress code comes from the market 
inspector manual of 14th century. Ibn al-Ukhuwwa (d. 1329) complains in 
his Maʿālim al-Qurba fī Aḥkām al-Ḥisba, that it impossible to distinguish 
between dhimmī women and Muslim women when they leave their houses 
and walk the streets.12 Indeed, there is ample evidence indicating that 
medieval Jewish and probably also Christian communities in different 
places of the Muslim world, applied similar rules of modesty, clothing 
norms and behavior as their Muslim contemporaries.13 Legal discussions 
and responsa found in the Geniza, suggest that these veils covered 
significant parts of the body, or alternatively, women were not seen much 
in public space. 
Still the veiling habits of non-Muslims in the Middle East receive less 
attention from medieval sources. One possible reason for that is that there 
is no Jewish or Christian legal source commending girls or women to wear 
veils of any kind. Nor was there governmental rule enforcing a veil on none 
Muslims.14 Another explanation might be that it was such a common norm, 
that there was no need in discussing it. Yet, veiling and the covering of the 
                                                          
10 Dotan Arad. “Virginity, Conspiracies, and Hidden Faces: A Case of a Marital Quarrel in 
Damascus that Led to a Rabbinic Dispute” (Hebrew), Sefunot 25 (2017), p. 71.  
11 For some examples of dowry lists contains veil see, e.g. TS 16.71, a marriage contract 
from 1084, published by Mordechai Akiva Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine: A 
Cairo Geniza Study, II. (Tel Aviv & New York, 1982), pp. 219-226, see ibid. p. 225, note 
to line 24 and the sources cited there. See further Yedida Khalfon Stillmann, “Female 
Attire of Medieval Egypt according to the Trousseau Lists and Cognate Material from 
the Cairo Geniza,” Ph.D. Dissertation, (University of Pennsylvania 1972), pp. 116-117, 
165-168 and the index; Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Jewish Law as Witness to Sexual 
Mores among Jews in Islamic Countries during the Middle Ages: Veils and Temporary 
Marriage” (Hebrew), Pe‘amim 45 (1990), pp. 91–99.  
12 Ibn al-Ukhuwwah, Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Qurashi. Maʿālim al-Qurba fī 
Aḥkām al-Ḥisba. ed. Reuben Levy. (Cambridge: E. E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, 1938). 
p. 43 [Eng. tran. p. 15]. 
13 See, for instance, S. D. Goitein. A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the 
Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza, vol. I, (Los-Angeles 
1967), pp. 70-74. On the influence of Muslim society on Jewish Marriage see Mordechai 
Akiva Friedman, “The Ethics of Medieval Jewish Marriage,” in: S. D. Goitein (ed.), 
Religion in a Religious Age (Cambridge, Mass. 1974), pp. 83–102; id. “Polygyny in Jewish 
Tradition and Practice: New Sources from the Cairo Geniza,” PAAJR 49 (1982), pp. 33–
68. 
14 M. A. Friedman, “Jewish Law,” p. 98.  




female body had different implications and was based on concepts and 
perceptions of women, and their place in society. 
Veiling and dress code is not only about gender issues or modesty and 
body perceptions. It is also about social norms and social structures. As 
argued by Hadas Hirsch: “All the components of outward appearances, set 
up by people also mirror hierarchical relationships, including gender-
based power relations.”15 The patriarchal and patrilineal hegemony is 
reinforced (also) by stipulating rules of modesty. The issue of veiling is 
therefore not only a question of custom, norm or even religious 
commandments, it was, and still is, a question of where a person is on the 
social ladder.  
By discussing the case of a groom to-be negotiating the terms for his 
future marriage we wish to unveil some of the meanings of coverage 
practiced by Jewish women in medieval Egypt and perhaps the nature such 
veils. The groom’s arguments and the response it generated on the part of 
the bride’s father, will allow us to look into social norms and methods used 
to implement these norms. As will be argued, the responsum tells the 
wishes of the two parties, concerning a veil, but should also be read as part 
of constructing hierarchy, between the two parties, setting their place 
within the community.  
The responsum alludes to the bride, but she is not there on her own 
behalf. Her father is serving as her representative. Jewish law recognizes 
the concept of agency, as stated in Mishna qiddushin (2:1): “A man betroths 
independently or through his agent. A woman is betrothed independently 
or through her agent. A man betroths his daughter, when she is has not 
reached puberty, independently or through his agent.” According to this 
Mishna a woman is not permitted to arrange her own marriage, if she is a 
minor, as long as her father is alive. In reality, even mature woman usually 
had to appoint her father or other male relative as her agent in arranging 
the marriage, and hardly do we hear about mature women who arranged 
their marriage by themselves.16 The validity of betrothal contracted by the 
father of a mature woman whom she had not appointed as her agent was 
questioned during the Gaonic period; some considered it invalid, while 
                                                          
15 Hadas Hirsch, “Personal Grooming and Outward Appearance in Early Muslim 
Societies,” Al-Masaq 23.2 (2011), p. 101. 
16 See Sa’adya Gaon responsum in Sha’arei Zedeq, Salonika, 1792; (Jerusalem, 1966) 
(Hebrew), p. 40, no. 12. In TS 8 J 22.29, a responsum sent to Maimonides, we hear 
about a mature girl who received her betrothal while her father was away in another 
city. This document is about be published by Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Geniza 
Studies and Maimonidean Research,” (in Hebrew) in: Maimonides and the Cairo Geniza 
(ed. M. A. Friedman), Jerusalem (accepted for publication). 




others recognized a girl's implicit acceptance of any betrothal contracted 
by her father as being equivalent to agency.17 
 
Back to our document, this fragment is the only known example of a 
groom's demand to see his bride before the wedding and the bride’sfather 
refuses to expose her to the groom. 
The honorific titles written (in Hebrew) in the opening lines of the 
query are typically found in documents relating to Abraham Maimuni (d. 
1236), Maimonides' son. The handwriting is probably not later than the 
13thcentury, so this query might have been sent to him.18 
 
 ]...[ו 1
 ]... הרב המו[בהק 2
 ]... נ[ר המערבי 3
 ]... יחיד[ הדור אור 4
 ]העולם ופל[או ממזרח שמש 5
 ]ועד מבוא[ו ירום הודו ויגדל 6
 ]כבו[דו אמן ]נ[צח סלה 7
 ]ראובן א[מלך עלי אבנה שמעון 8
 ]וטלב ר[אובן אן יבצר אבנה שמע 9
 ]וקאל ל[ה ראובן מא אזווג׳ אבנתך אלא 11
 ]... בע[ד אבצרהא בעיני ואדכל עלי 11
 ]...[יאן מחץ פקאל שמעון אדא אראד 12
 ]... א[חד? יבצר בנאת אלנאס ירוח 13
 ]וידכלהן[ לחג׳רה יקלב בעינה ]י[ורנו ]ר[בנו 14
 ]...[ אן קול ראובן חק פי מא קאלה 15
 קול ...]...[וית]בת?[...ל].[ל שמעון  16
 ]...[וישרט? ראובן? 17
 
 
                                                          
17 For a lengthy discussion on the bride’s agent in Jewish law and the in Geniza marriage 
contracts see Mordechai Akiva Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine: A Cairo Geniza 
Study. Vol. I: The Ketubba Traditions of Eretz-Israel. (Tel-Aviv and New York, 1982), pp. 
216-232. Medieval Muslim legal scholars also restrict the rights and authorities of a 
guardian who is not the girl's father. For the Islamic medieval legal discourse of 
guardianship in marriage see also Susan Spectorsky, Chapters on Marriage and Divorce: 
Responses of Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Rahwayh (Austin, 2010), Introduction, esp. pp. 10-11. 
In case, if a father is unable to act as guardian, the duty falls on the girl's nearest agnate 
male relative only, e.g. grandfather, uncle. In one case narrated by Ibn Saʿd (d. 845), 
when Sukayna attempted to be her own guardian, the marriage were revoked under 
the orders of the Umayyad Caliph Hishām ibn ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 724-743). See Ibn Saʿd 
(d. 845), Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kabīr, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿAmr. (Cairo, 2001), 10, p. 440. 
18 It was first published by Amir Ashur at http://www.lib.cam.ac.uk/Taylor-
Schechter/fotm/october-2008/ 





1–7  (Introductory phrases in Hebrew addressing the legal expert.) 
8  [Reuben] engaged/betrothed Shimon's daughter. 
9  Reuben [demanded] to see Shimon's daughter, 
10  [and] Reuben [said to] him: 'I shall marry your daughter 
11  only after seeing her with my eyes, so that I enter (the marriage?) 
with 
12  complete [confidence (?)]. And Shimon told him: ‘if 
13  [… some] one wants to see other people's daughters, he should 
14  [first bring them] into his jurisdiction [= marry them] and examine 
(them then) with his own eyes.’ Would our Rabbi instruct us 
15  […] if Reuben's words are true 
16  and valid (?) […or] if Shimon's words are …. 
17  and Reuben(?) shall stipulate(?) 
 
Although the manuscript is fragmentary, we are able to reconstruct its 
main story: Reuben (‘Joe Bloggs’) engaged (or betrothed, the 
verb amlaka in line 8 has both meanings)19 Shimon’s (‘Mr. So-and-So’) 
daughter without seeing her. As the time of the wedding approached, 
Reuben demanded to see her before actually marrying her. At this point, 
the manuscript is badly damaged, but it appears that Shimon rejected 
Reuben's demand and argued that a man should see his bride only after he 
married her.  
This short question provides very little detail, we don’t know the name 
or any other detail regarding the bride to be, we don’t even know whether 
she was consulted before her father refused Reuven’s request. 
The absence of the bride is rather common in medieval texts pertaining 
marriage. Ranging from different times and places, legal responsas indicate 
that brides-to-be’s consent is hardly ever discussed. This does not to argue 
that it was rarely sought or asked, but only that it was not frequently 
mentioned, or may not needed (for instance, in cases of a minor bride).20 
Islamic legal discourse mention the need in a bride’s consent, and in some 
contexts it seems that females had a significant part in arraigning marriage 
(their own, or family members’). Should we look for Islamic negotiations 
for marriage, we may find that in Mamluk Egypt (1250-1517 AD), women 
took significant part in arranging marriage. Additionally, women could 
                                                          
19 For the translation See Joshua Blau, A Dictionary of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic Text, 
(Jerusalem 2006), p. 668; Mordechai Akiva Friedman, A Dictionary of  Medieval Judeo-
Arabic in the India Book Letters from the Geniza and in other Texts. (Jerusalem 2016), p. 
476. (Hebrew) 
20  For a unique case of acceptance of marriage by the bride see Amir Ashur, “Jewish 
marriage customs in Spain as reflected in the Cairo Geniza documents,” in Entre Oriente 
y Occidente: Textos y espacios medievales. (Córdoba, 2016), pp. 146-147. 




appeal the Sharʿī court for divorce in case their Sharʿī rights were not 
met.21 Evidence of involvement of women in the negotiations of marriage 
contracts among elite women may be found in other regions of the Muslim 
world. For instance, Hanneh discusses several examples of 11th century 
Saljūq elite women participation in marriage negotiations. Interestingly, 
Hanneh points out that while both ‘Abbasid elite women as well as their 
Saljūq counterparts were active in setting marital alliances, ʿAbbasid 
women are merely described, while Saljūqs are depicted as actual actors.22 
This of course, does not indicate that women were generally involved in 
setting marriage contracts; it is also hard to evaluate how many women 
were indeed in a position to choose or to revoke marriage decided by their 
legal guardians. 
The question of whether a man is allowed to see his future wife is much 
discussed also among Muslims legal scholars. In Septorsky’s collection of 
responsas (fatāwī) by Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Rāhwayh it is evident that 
betrothed did not always see one another before marriage and that it 
produced different problematic incidents. One such instance is a man who 
married a woman (by proxy? The text provides no information regarding 
this issue), and only after taking a nap besides her did he learn of her color. 
Hence he sent her a divorce without even seeing her. The responsa 
concerned the fiscal obligations between the couples, was she entitled for 
her full dower? And was the divorced woman obligated to wait a waiting 
period before remarrying?23 The question does not inquire whether it was 
legal for the couple to marry without seeing one another, but assumes it to 
be a reasonable situation. Here too, the woman is almost completely 
absent. She is betrothed and sent away without consulting her wishes. That 
does not mean that her interests are overlooked, the very discussion 
demonstrates that the legal authorities who discussed the case were 
concerned with the woman’s wellbeing, and made every effort that her 
status – social and economic – will not be damaged, hence discussing her 
rights for full dower payment. 
The question of concern here was shared by other religious community. 
A similar discussion is to be found among Muslim scholars. The discussion 
supporting the right of the betrothed to see one another before the 
wedding stems from of the sayings (ḥadith) attributed to the Prophet 
Muhammad: 
                                                          
21 Yossef Rapoport, “Divorce and the elite household in late medieval Cairo,” Continuity 
and change 16.02 (2001), pp. 201-218. 
22 Eric J. Hanne, “Women, Power, and the Eleventh and Twelfth Century Abbasid Court,” 
Hawwa 3.1 (2005), pp. 80-110, especially pp. 87-97. It was not rare to find a woman 
arranging the marriage agreement in engagement deeds from the Cairo Geniza, see A. 
Ashur, “Engagement and Betrothal,” p. 62. 
23 Spectorsky, Chapters on Marriage and Divorce, pp. 99-100. 





I was in the company of Allah's Messenger when there came a man and 
informed him that he had contracted to marry a woman of the Anṣār [the 
people of al-Madina]. Thereupon Allah's Messenger said: Did you cast a 
glance at her? He said: No. He said: Go and cast a glance at her, for there is 
something in the eyes of the Anṣār.24 
 
Islamic discourse relates to another aspect of the connection between 
marriage and the gaze. Seeing hampers not only the see-e but also the seer. 
Seeing an object that may raise desire, is a much discussed issue is 
medieval Islamic exegesis and legal discussions. Several sayings attributed 
to the Prophet Muhammad relate a commandment to lower one’s gaze, 
thus keep one’s modesty as well as the modesty of the object seen – a 
woman. Additionally, there is a clear association between being married, 
and being able to keep one’s gaze from wondering into the wrong place.  
Marriage in a way is a means to prevent one from coming sinful acts. If 
one’s desire is raised, he should opt for marriage, hence keep his desire in 
an appropriate context.25 
For instance:  
 
The Messenger of God said: O young men!  
Those of you who have reached puberty (or: are capable of having 
intercourse—marry! This will facilitate the 
lowering of your eyes, and it will be better for your genitals.26 
 
Hence the hadith associates between seeing and sexual intercourse. When 
a man has a wife, his lust is in control, thus his eyes are kept in the right 
place (away from strange women). 
The issue is still under discussion as may be learned from contemporary 
legal discussion. Several ifta’ sites discuss the question quoting hadith and 
Quran verses. One recent and interesting fatwa on the subject was 
                                                          
24 See Abū al-Ḥussain Muslīm bin al-Hajjaj (d. 875), Saḥīḥ Muslim (edited by Hāfiz Abū 
Tāhir Zubair ʿAlī Zaʾi, tran. Nasiruddin al-Khattab, Riyad, 2007), The Book of Marriage, 
vol. 4, pp. 47-48. Contemporary discourses of the issue indicate additional hadith 
pertaining the need to one’s future partner. For instance, Sheikh Ibn Baz, a prominent 
Saudi scholar (d. 1999) quotes the following prophetic saying: “Souls are like 
conscripted soldiers those whom they recognize, they come together, and those whom 
they do not recognize, they stay away” (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, vol. 6, pp. 497-498). Ibn al-Bazz 
explains that betrothed should see each other, as gazing into one’s eyes is seeing into 
their souls. Hence seeing will help, once married bring affinity. For the full answer by 
Ibn al-Bazz see http://tinyurl.com/gm7sk3r  (accessed January 3, 2018).  
25 See for instance Ze'ev Maghen’s analysis of the gaze in different contexts, Ze'ev Maghen, 
“See No Evil: Morality and Methodology in Ibn Al-Qattān al-Fāsī's Ahkām al-nazar bi-
Hāssat al-Basar,” Islamic law and society 14.3 (2007), pp. 342-390.  
26 As quoted in Maghen, “See no Evil,” p. 363. 




published by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent Sunni scholar currently 
residing in Qatar. In his book: The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam he 
argues that a man who’s heart is sincere in intending to marry a woman, he 
should see her face and only then should they marry.27 
It is possible that this short text translated above reveals the difficulties 
of a young couple, with very little control over their life, and the man’s 
struggle for attaining some kind of control.  
It is plausible that there are some other details we are ignorant of: some 
gossip or rumor spread about the anonymous daughter, or maybe Reuven 
was married in the past and wanted to refrain from past mistakes? 
Perhaps other fathers allowed their daughters to meet (accompanied, 
naturally) their betrothed and Reuven wanted similar conditions as his 
friends enjoyed. Another possible tension may be an economic 
disagreement: in cases of breaking a marriage agreement the faulty party 
needs to compensate the other party.28 It is possible that by turning to a 
religious authority, asking for something impossible would allow a way out 
of unwanted marriage; either Shimon or Reuven were trying to evade 
paying the fine (as mentioned above, the issue was indeed of interest in 
legal discussions among Muslim scholars). Unfortunately, the manuscript 
is not complete, and we don't know what decision was reached. 
Let us look into the legal discourse regarding the permissibility of 
seeing one’s betrothed. According to an opinion discussed in the 
Babylonian Talmud, tractate Qiddushin 41a, a man is prohibited from 
betrothing a woman without first seeing her: 
 
Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: it is forbidden for one to marry betroth a 
woman until he has seen her, lest he sees something ugly about her and she 
becomes repulsive to him, and the Torah said (Lev. 19:18) "Love your 
neighbor as yourself”. 
 
Our query is clear evidence that this ruling was not always kept, and 
peopleused to engage or betroth their wives-to-be without seeing them. 
This however, introduced a new set of questions and needs. What if what 
one sees under the hupa is not what he had expected? The Mishna, 
Ketubbot 7:8 ruled that a man, who marries a woman and finds a ‘hidden-
blemish’ in her, can have the marriage annulled, but if the blemish is 
apparent, he can do nothing: 
                                                          
27 Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwi, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam, trans. (Kuala Lampur, 2013), 
pp. 190-192. 
28 Such stipulations are found in most, if not all, the marriage and pre-nuptial agreements 
from the Geniza, see Amir Ashur, “Protecting the Wife’s Rights in Marriage as Reflected 
in Pre-Nuptials and Marriage Contracts from the Cairo Geniza and Parallel Arabic 
Sources,” Religion Compass 6.8 (2012), pp. 381–389. 





If she was afflicted with bodily defects while she was still in her father's 
house, her father must produce proof that these defects developed after she 
had been betrothed … If she came under the authority of her husband, the 
husband must produce proof that she had these defects before she had been 
betrothed and his only to concealed bodily defects; but, regarding defects 
that are exposed, he cannot make any claim. 
 
For the above discussion the implication was that a person may have never 
had the chance of laying his eyes on his future bride. A more detailed 
report is given by R. Shlomo Ibn Parḥon in his Maḥberet ha-ʿArukh, from 
the middle of the 12th century: 
 
It is the custom in the Land of Israel and Babylonia and Spain that all of the 
women cover their faces with a cloth. And when they wrap it around their 
faces they leave a hole opposite one eye at the edge of the cloth, with which 
to see, for it is forbidden to look at women… And only in the Christian 
countries do women go out with uncovered faces.29 
 
The following halakhic work found in the Geniza discloses that the 
Talmudic requirement to see a woman before betrothing her did not apply 
in Muslim lands: 
 
The statement of Rav Judah … “it is forbidden for one to marry30 a woman 
until he sees her, lest he sees something ugly about her and she becomes 
repulsive to him” … refers to the situation in antiquity when girls would 
walk about exposed and to the practice followed in countries of Christian 
Europe until now.31 
 
Seeing, or more accurately, the implications of not seeing, echo from a 
ruling by Maimonides 
 
If the woman's habit is to cover herself and to hide even in the bathhouse, 
or she washes at night, or in a small private room in the bathhouse, so she 
will not be seen, and no one will know of her, [her husband] may issue a 
claim, even with regard to blemishes that can be seen openly.32 
 
                                                          
29 As translated in Abraham Grossman, Pious and Rebellious, 2004, p. 106. R. Petaḥya of 
Regensburg, who visited Baghdad in the 1170’s, mentioned that no one can see a 
woman there, and nobody is visiting his neighbor’s house from the fear that he might 
see his wife, see Sivuv R. Petaḥya mi-Regensburg, (ed. Grinhout, Frankfurt 1905), p. 8 
(cited by Grossman, ibid, and p. 293, n. 10). 
30 In our version of the Talmud 'betroth'. 
31 Bodl. MS Heb. c 23, fol. 27r (see Friedman, “Jewish Law”). The English translation is 
from Friedman, Jewish marriage in Palestine, II, p. 225. 
32 Mishne Torah, Ishshut 25, 2. See discussion by Friedman, “Jewish Law”. 




In this ruling, Maimonides discusses the scope of a blemish (pegam) which 
will allow the groom to ask for divorce once discovered. The Mishnaic 
discussion distinguishes between a visible blemish: that is something a 
person has the means to see and notice even before sharing a home with 
the woman, and a none-visible blemish. None-visible refers to problems 
and defects one is less likely to see or even be able to. This ruling suggests 
that one has some – perhaps limited – access to his future wife, which 
allows him to see those “visible blemishes”. In case of a visible blemish, the 
groom has no grounds to as for divorce, as he should have noticed it prior 
to marriage. 
In his ruling, Maimonides related to the Mishna concept of visible defect, 
but offers a some what different concept of defects and their being a valid 
ground of divorce. Maimonides actually changes the category of validity to 
include also visible defects. In other words, Maimonides allows a man to 
ask for divorce for any defect, were it visible or not. His ruling brings to the 
fore the social norms and dress code of his time. One possible and sensible 
explanation to his ruling is that in a reality where a man unable to see his 
future wife, the differentiation between visible or concealed blemishes 
cannot be implemented.  
From Maimonides’ ruling we might assume that it was also common for 
the betrothed not to see each other before the wedding night. So what 
triggered or what made Reuven consider his request valid? 
It is possible that the father of the bride was not only acknowledging 
contemporary norms of behavior but also the association between gaze 
and desire. Hence his answer, if Revuen wishes to see his daughter, he 
should first marry her. Additionally, the hiding of the face of the bride to be 
is also setting her position among the righteous and modest girls of 
community. The father maybe most concerned with his own social status, 
and in subjecting the groom to be to local norms, but he is also concerned 
with his daughter’s social status and good name. For “good girls” should 
not be seen in public.33 
Let’s go back to our query. Reading it brings to the fore the echoes of 
various tensions between the protagonists. Some relate to the different 
starting point of each: for instance, it is possible that Reuven is not a local 
or has only recently joined the community, thus the norms he is familiar 
with may be different. Among European Jews it was common for the 
betrothed to see one another before the wedding. Hence, one possible 
explanation for Reuven’s request was that he wished to enjoy the 
conditions he would have had in his country of origin. That may also 
explain his choice of words: using the singular (i.e. representing himself), 
while Shimon uses the plural (representing, or even defending, the 
                                                          
33 As argued by Friedman, “Jewish Law,” p. 97. 




customs and norms of the entire community from foreign influence). So is 
the choice of words by the initiators of the question, as well as the 
hovering question regarding the non-present object of inquiry, Shimon’s 
daughter. 
Reuven wishes to see his future wife, while Shimon is reluctant to 
comply. The very request is an exceptionally intriguing one. From what we 
learn from the above discussed Halachik discourse, it is implied that seeing 
one’s betrothed should be granted easily. However, the very existence of 
the responsum indicates it was not. The debate and arguments brought 
about by the father and the groom one may learn that in the balance and 
mutual interaction between social norms and legal ruling, social norms 
may have had the upper hand, and at times it was those social norms who 
actually dictated the situation.  
 
